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Criminal Procedure: Allowing the Prosecution a "Second
Bite at the Apple"1 in Non-Capital Sentencing: Monge v.
California
L Introduction
Rarely do drug dealers like Angel Jaime Monge arouse much sympathy.
However, Monge's case is not about sympathy; his case concerns the fundamental
right to receive a fair trial. The United States Constitution guarantees every
criminal defendant a fair trial.' The Constitution guarantees that the government
will jeopardize no person's life or liberty more than once for the same offense 3
In Benton v. Maryland," the United States Supreme Court made the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 Monge v. California' clarified the application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause by answering: Can the State place a convicted defendant
in jeopardy of losing his liberty multiple times by allowing the prosecution
multiple chances to try its "repeat offender" (recidivism) allegations?" The Monge
Court held that our Constitution fails to protect a defendant from double jeopardy
in such circumstances.8 The State may repeatedly attempt to use alleged prior
offenses to enhance sentencing for the same offense. Unlike cases where a
defendant's life is on the line, the Court affords a person's mere liberty less
constitutional protection. Therefore, as in Monge, where the prosecution conceded
to the California Court of Appeals that it failed to prove the sentencing allegations
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent a retrial
of non-capital sentencing. The prosecution may repeatedly attempt to prove
recidivist allegations until it eventually musters enough evidence to deprive the
defendant of his liberty. Will Oklahoma state courts follow the Monge decision by
treating its criminal defendants' liberty with such callous disregard?
This note seeks to answer this question. First, Part I gives a brief overview of
federal and Oklahoma law with respect to sentence enhancement. Part H of this
note reviews the history of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Next, Part InI provides
1. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978).
2. See U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("nor shall any person be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without the due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
3. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
5. See id. at 796.
6. 524 U.S. 721 (1998).
7. Recidivism allegations refer to the prosecution.'s charge that the defendant is a repeat or habitual
felon. BLAcK'S LAW DICnONARY 1276 (7th ed. 1999).
8. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 734.
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an overview of the Monge decision. Part IV shows how the Court could have
easily ruled in favor of extending double jeopardy protection to sentencing
proceedings and discusses Oklahoma's options after Monge.
A. Enhanced Punishment for Recidivists
The growing popularity of "Three Strikes"9 laws has created sentencing
procedures under which the prosecution must prove recidivism allegations in order
to enhance a sentence. Under these types of statutes, a court can double or even
triple a defendant's sentence if the State shows that the defendant has prior
convictions. During the sentencing phase of a bifurcated trial, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt whether the defendant was actually convicted of
the alleged prior convictions."0 Therefore, with sentencing procedures becoming
complex and more trial-like, courts must decide whether trial protections, such as
the protection against double jeopardy, should extend to these trial-like sentencing
proceedings. The opinions in Monge presented three distinct views regarding
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause should apply to non-capital sentencing. First,
the majority held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect a defendant
from a retrial of a non-capital sentencing phase," even when the prosecution fails
to produce evidence to support the recidivism charges at the first sentencing
trial." The second view, articulated by Justice Stevens' dissent, drew a distinction
between insufficient evidence and legal error. Justice Stevens proposed that the
Constitution protects the former from double jeopardy, but not the latter. The
third view set forth in a dissent by three Justices claimed that sentence enhan-
cements are separate elements of the offense and, therefore, should receive double
jeopardy protection.'
B. Oklahoma's Enhancement Statutes
Like most states, Oklahoma has sentence enhancements for recidivist defen-
dants." Recently, the Oklahoma legislature constructed sentencing matrices that
9. Basically, "Three Strikes" laws refer to laws that allow for increased or enhanced sentences
based upon a defendants habitually criminal nature. In order to enhance a defendant's sentence, the
prosecution must prove that the defendant has prior felony convictions. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 7, at 1490.
10. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1128 (Cal. 1997) (stating that burden of proof for
recidivist allegations in sentencing enhancement is beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Tenner, 862
P.2d 840, 845 (Cal. 1993) (same); Cooper v. State, 810 P.2d 1303, 1305-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991)
(same); Mitchell v. State, 659 P.2d 366, 369-70 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (same); see also Monge, 524
U.S. at 727.
11. The distinction between capital and non-capital sentencing began in 1981 when the Court carved
out a narrow exception to the rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to the sentencing
phase of a bifurcated trial. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981). In Bullinglon, the
Court found double jeopardy protection for capital sentencing based upon its trial-like proceedings. Id.
12. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 734.
13. See id. at 736 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. See id. at 738 (Scalia, J., dissenting).




specify the criteria for determining the length of an enhancement. 6 To determine
a sentence, Oklahoma allows for bifurcated proceedings in which the prosecution
must prove the recidivism allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.17 Often,
Oklahoma courts must review the validity of enhancing a defendant's sentence.
However, as Justice Stevens suggested, Oklahoma courts distinguish between
insufficient evidence and legal error with respect to a retrial of recidivism
allegations. Specifically, in Cooper v. State,8 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals did not allow the prosecution a second chance to prove recidivism
allegations. The Cooper court remanded the case for the trial court to set the
sentence without enhancement. 9 Additionally, in Robertson v. State,' the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found that the State can retry sentencing
phases only in cases involving legal error once jeopardy has attached' Clearly,
Oklahoma courts can retry the sentencing phase in cases of legal error. However,
where the prosecution fails to provide sufficient recidivism evidence, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals refuses to allow the prosecution a second chance once
jeopardy has attached.' With the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Monge,
Oklahoma courts no longer have to make this distinction.
II. The History of Double Jeopardy
A. The Evolution of Double Jeopardy Protection
The rule forbidding a judiciary from trying and punishing a person more than
once for the same offense is as old as law itself.
It is impossible to trace the doctrine [of double jeopardy] to any
distinct origin. It seems to have been always embedded in the common
law of England, as well as in the Roman law, and doubtless in every
other system of jurisprudence, and, instead of having a specific origin,
it simply always existed."
The United States adopted the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which
includes the Double Jeopardy Clause, in 1791. While the words of the
Amendment seem straightforward, its application is as complex as criminal
procedure itself. Confusion stems from the supposition that "[tihe drafters...
were so steeped in common law that they tended to perpetuate its inadequacies
1997 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 133, § 602 (effective July 1, 1999)).
16. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 20.1 (Supp. 1998)
17. See Mitchell v. State, 659 P.2d 366, 369-70 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
18. 810 P.2d 1303 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
19. See i&L at 1306.
20. 888 P.2d 1023 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)
21. See id. at 1025; see also Campbell v. State, 373 P.2d 844, 847 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962).
22. "Only judgments or sentences void on their face may be set aside after jeopardy has attached."
Robertson, 888 P.2d at 1025.
23. Stout v. State, 130 P. 553, 558 (Okla. 1913).
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2000]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
rather than declare a precise protection for a criminal defendant."' The drafters
included the Double Jeopardy Clause to embody two common law defenses of the
era.' The first common law defense prevented a retrial once a defendant was
"already acquitted."" The second common law defense prevented a retrial once
a defendant was "already convicted."' This second defense effectively prevented
defendants from appealing a conviction." Later interpretations of the Double
Jeopardy Clause allowed defendants the opportunity to appeal a conviction." The
reasoning behind these current interpretations is that jeopardy should not attach
until a defendant has had one trial free of error."
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court "incorporated" the Double Jeopardy
Clause,32 applying the Clause not only to the federal government but also to the
states as well. The Court found that the principle behind the Double Jeopardy
Clause is "a fundamental ideal in our Constitutional heritage, and that it should
apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."' Interestingly, at the
time of incorporation, every state had adopted some form of double jeopardy ban
through its state constitution or common law.3 ' The language setting forth the
Court's rationale behind incorporating the Double Jeopardy Clause comes from
Green v. United States:'
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
25. JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLEJEOPARDY: THEDEVELOPMENTOFALEOAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 32-33
(1969).
26. See iii at 33.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 36 & n.148.
30. See generally id. at 1-37 (discussing the evolution of double jeopardy protection in the United
States).
31. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
32. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
33. Courts developed the application of the Bill of Rights, but
[o]riginally, the Bill of Rights was only applicable to the federal government. However,
using the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has found most of the
clauses contained in the Bill of Rights so fundamental that they must apply against the
states as well. When the Court finds a right so fundamental, it is referred to as
"incorporated" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead of
incorporating the entire Bill of Rights at once, the Court has selectively incorporated these
rights over the years. Accordingly, the Court has not yet incorporated every right
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 404 (1998). See id. § 405 for a comprehensive list of the rights
incorporated by the CourL
34. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
35. See id. at 795.




a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty."
B. Federal Interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
1. Interpretation Regarding Trial Phase
For over a century, the United States Supreme Court has relied on Ball v. United
States8 as an interpretational guide to the Double Jeopardy Clause. However,
many courts have misinterpreted the Ball rule over the years. 9 In Burks v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court interpreted Ball to hold that a defendant
can be re-prosecuted for an offense when the court sets aside his conviction based
on legal error' In Burks, the Court clarified the distinction between a retrial due
to legal error and a retrial due to insufficient evidence. The Burks Court held that
"the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the
prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the
first proceeding."'42 Therefore, at the beginning of a trial, double jeopardy
protection attaches barring a retrial due to insufficient evidence; however, it does
not bar a retrial when a legal error occurs, such as wrongly admitting evidence or
improperly instructing the jury. The fundamental rule from Ball, further clarified
in Burks, forms the heart of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
2. Interpretation Regarding Sentencing Phase
In Bullington v. Missouri," the United States Supreme Court carved out an
exception to the long-standing rule that double jeopardy protection does not apply
to sentencing." When life is at stake, the Court held that a defendant deserves
double jeopardy protection in capital sentencing because this type of sentencing
phase bears the "hallmarks of a trial."' Using the standard language quoted supra
37. Id at 187-88.
38. 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896) ("[A] defendant who procures a judgment against him upon an
indictment to be set aside may be tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon another indictment, for
the same offense of which he has been convicted.").
39. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978) (stating that failure to make a distinction
"between reversals dub to trial error and those resulting from evidentiary insufficiency .. .has
contributed substantially to the ... confusion existing in this area of law."). Part 11 of the Burks opinion
gives a comprehensive look at the case law misinterpreting Ball. See id at 5-10; Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 328 (1957) (granting a new trial as a remedy where the prosecution failed to prove its
case).
40. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
41. See Ball, 163 U.S. at 672. The Burks Court clarified this interpretation. See Burks, 437 U.S. at
14.
42. Burks, 437 U.S. at 11.
43. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
44. See id at 446. Since 1919, the Court has "resisted attempts to extend [Double Jeopardy
protection] to sentencing." Id at 438; see, e.g., United States v. Difrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980);
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Stroud v.
United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
45. See Bu~ington, 451 U.S. at 438-39. The Court lists some of the procedures that constitute
20001
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from Green, the Court applied the Clause as a heightened procedural protection
for the defendant.47 Basically, the Court wanted to provide finality to capital
sentencing. Following Green, the Court reasoned that a defendant should not fear
that the State will retry capital sentencing once a court imposes a non-capital
sentence s
In Lockhart v. Nelson,9 the Court, as it did in Burks, made an important dis-
tinction between retrial of a sentence based upon insufficient evidence and retrial
of a sentence based upon legal error.' The Lockhart Court held that, where
evidence is admitted erroneously, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude
the retrial of a sentence enhancement allegation."1 Because the issue was not
before the Court, however, it could not address whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause precludes the retrial of a sentence where evidence was insufficient to prove
recidivism. In dicta, the Court suggested that it would bar a retrial in cases where
the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence of recidivism.' Six years
later in Schiro v. Farley,' the Court stated that "[t]he state is entitled to 'one fair
opportunity' to prosecute a defendant... and that opportunity extends not only to
prosecution at the guilt phase, but also to present evidence at an ensuing
sentencing proceeding."'
C. Oklahoma Interpretation of Double Jeopardy Before Monge v. California
The Oklahoma Constitution contains a Double Jeopardy Clause substantially
similar to the one in the United States Constitution."5 In fact, Oklahoma courts
hallmarks of a trial including: making opening statements, hearing testimony of witnesses, introducing
evidence, instructing the jury, making final arguments, having jury deliberations and having the jury
return its verdict. See id. at 439 n.10.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
47. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 444-46.
48. See id. at 445.
49. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
50. See id.
51. See id. at34.
52. See id at 40-42.
53. 510 U.S. 222 (1994).
54. lId at 231-32 (citation omitted). Interestingly, the Monge Court did not overrule Schiro, but
relied on it as precedent. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721,730 (1998). However, the Monge Court
misinterpreted Schiro. In Schiro, the defendant claimed that the bifurcated sentencing phase violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause as a successive prosecution. See Schiro, 510 U.S. at 229. The Court held that
a separate sentencing proceeding following conviction at trial is not a re-prosecution of guilt, but a trial
to determine punishment. See id. at 231. The Schiro Court reinforced that the reason behind the Bul-
lington exception was the trial-like proceedings in that case. See id. "Because the capital sentencing
proceeding 'was itself a trial on the issue of punishment,' requiring a defendant to submit to a second,
identical proceeding was tantamount to permitting a second prosecution of an acquitted defendant." Id.
(quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446'(1981)). The Monge Court incorrectly stated that
Schiro stands for the proposition that "double jeopardy principles have no application in the sentencing
context." Monge, 524 U.S. at 730.
55. "[N]or shall any person, after having been once acquitted by a jury, be again put in jeopardy
of life or liberty for that of which he has been acquitted. Nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy




treat the state and federal clauses as one in the same.' Furthermore, as in Burks,
Oklahoma courts commonly distinguish between a retrial based upon trial error and
a retrial based upon insufficient evidence. With the former, Oklahoma courts
follow the "clean slate" rule.' Once a defendant succeeds in overturning a
conviction based upon trial error, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the
state from retrying the defendant." Oklahoma courts reason that because the
overturning court nullifies the conviction, the slate is effectively wiped clean. 9
More importantly, the courts seem willing to extend the clean slate rule to the
retrial of sentencing procedures. For example, in Robertson v. State,' the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated "[oinly judgments or sentences void
on their face may be set aside after jeopardy has attached."6 In Robertson, the
defendant received a sentence that was below the statutorily prescribed range and,
therefore, void on its face. Essentially using the clean slate rule, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals found that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a
trial court from re-sentencing a defendant in this situation.
An Oklahoma case analogous to Monge is Cooper v. State.' In Cooper, a jury
found the defendant guilty on two counts of drug charges and sentenced him to
two consecutive prison terms, each lasting fifty years and one day. At the
enhancement proceedings, the prosecution alleged that the defendant had prior rape
convictions in California and Illinois. The prosecution admitted certified copies of
court records from those convictions. However, the California judgment listed
its defendant as "Cecil Cooper, Jr." and the Illinois judgment listed its defendant
as "Cecil Cooper. ' On appeal, the defendant argued that the differentiation in
names raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was the same person
listed in the California and Illinois judgments. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals found that because the defendant had a common name, the prosecution
had the burden of providing corroborative evidence to show that the documents
referenced the defendant. Absent this evidence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
56. In Kane v. State, 915 P.2d 932 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). the court stated that the Double
Jeopardy Clauses in the Oklahoma Constitution and the United States Constitution provide the same
protection and require the same analysis. See id at 934 n.5. Therefore, throughout this note, the term
"Double Jeopardy Clause" refers to both the Oklahoma and United States Constitution, unless otherwise
noted.
57. See Salazar v. State, 919 P.2d 1120, 1127 n.8 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981)).
58. See hd
59. See id.
60. 888 P.2d 1023 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
61. See id at 1025.
62. See id. (stating that re-sentencing was proper and mandatory under Oklahoma case law); see also
Stafford v. State, 800 P.2d 738, 740 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (applying the clean slate rule for a void
sentence).
63. 810 P.2d 1303 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
64. See id. at 1305.
65. See id. at 1305-06.
2o00
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Appeals found that the prosecution failed to prove the recidivism allegations
beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Without directly addressing double jeopardy issues, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals did not allow the prosecution a second chance to prove its
allegations.' The court remanded for re-sentencing so that the lower court could
deduct the enhancement from the defendant's sentence.' The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals did not allow the prosecution to provide any corroborating
evidence. This ruling suggests that Oklahoma courts will not allow a retrial of
enhancement allegations when the prosecution provides insufficient evidence to
support enhancement. In essence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
provided double jeopardy protection against a retrial when the prosecution failed
to support recidivist allegations with sufficient evidence.
III. Monge v. California
A. Facts and History of the Case
On the afternoon of January 25, 1995, Angel Monge employed a thirteen-year-
old boy to complete a marijuana sale to undercover officers of the Pomona Police
Department.' The charges against Monge consisted of three violations of the
California Health and Safety Code:' (1) use of a minor to sell marijuana;7 (2)
sale or transportation of marijuana-, and (3) possession of marijuana for sale."
Additionally, the California Penal Code provided sentence enhancement for
defendants with previous convictions of "serious felonies" ' and for previous
prison time served' The State sought sentence enhancement for both.' The
district attorney alleged that Monge had a prior conviction for assault with a
deadly weapon in 1992" and that Monge served time for the conviction.'
Monge pleaded not guilty to all counts and denied the prior conviction and prior
prison term allegations.'
66. See id.; see also Mitchell v. State, 659 P.2d 366,369-70 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (requiring the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all recidivism allegations during enhancement
proceedings).
67. See Cooper, 810 P.2d at 1306.
68. See iL
69. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1997).
70. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 724 (1998).
71. See id (citing CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361(a) (West 1991)).
72. See id. (citing CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11360(a)).
73. See i& (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11359).
74. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b)-(I), 1170.12(a)-(d) (1991). Under sections 667(d)(1) and
667(e)(1), a defendant's sentence may be doubled if the defendant has committed one prior serious
felony.
75. See id. § 667.5(b).
76. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 725 (1998).
77. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a).





In bifurcated proceedings, the jury convicted Monge on all counts. As requested
by Monge, the court determined his sentence. To trigger sentence enhancement,
California law requires that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was previously convicted of a serious felony.8' Therefore, the
prosecution had to prove that Monge either personally used a dangerous or deadly
weapon during the 1992 assault, or personally inflicted great bodily injury.'
During an informal conversation between judge and counsel, the prosecutor
claimed that Monge had used a stick in committing the 1992 incident. 3 The State
provided evidence of the seriousness of the 1992 felony, by using an abstract of
judgment" and a prison record" showing that Monge served time for assault
with a deadly weapon." However, the case does not indicate that the prosecutor
produced definitive evidence that Monge used a stick." Nevertheless, the judge
inferred that the assault actually occurred with a deadly weapon merely because
Monge pleaded guilty to the charge in 1992.' In actuality, the State never
produced direct evidence that Monge personally used a dangerous or deadly
weapon during the assault, or that Monge personally inflicted great bodily injury.
Based upon a circumstantial inference, the trial court found that the prosecution
proved the prior serious felony and prior prison term allegations.' Applying the
sentence enhancement for prior convictions, the court sentenced Monge to eleven
years in prison °
Monge appealed the enhancement decision.9 After reviewing both parties'
briefs, the California Court of Appeals determined that the State failed to produce
sufficient evidence to support the enhanced sentence.' Moreover, the State
80. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 725.
81. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (outlining convictions that constitute serious felonies). The
section qualifies a serious felony as "any felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily
injury on any person, other than an accomplice," id. § 1192.7(c)(8), and as "any felony in which the
defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon," i4. § 1192.7(c)(23).
82. See id. §§ 1192.7(c)(8), 1192.7(c)(23).
83. See Petitioner's Brief, Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998) (No. 97-6146), 1998 WL
88294, at *4.
84. An abstract of judgment, also known as an abstract of record, is an abbreviated but accurate
history of trial proceedings. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 9 (7th ed. 1999).
85. The state presented the evidence of the prison term in the form of a "prison packet" that
characterized Monge's conviction as "PC 245(a)(1) ADW GBI" and "ASLT W/DW (245(a)(1)PC)."
People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Cal. 1997). Presumably, "PC 245(a)(1)"and "(245(a)(l)PC)" is
an abbreviation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) (1991); and, "ADW GBI" and "ASLT W/DW" is an
abbreviation for assault with a deadly weapon and great bodily injury.
86. See Monge, 941 P.2d at 1124.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 725 (1998).
90. The court sentenced Monge to five years for using a minor to sell marijuana, and the sentence
doubled under sections 667(e)(1) and 1170.12(c)(1). See Monge, 941 P.2d at 1124. Monge received a
one-year enhancement for his prior prison term, a two-year concurrent sentence for possession of
marijuana for sale, and a three-year stayed sentence for selling marijuana. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 725.
91. See Monge, 941 P.2d at 1124.
92. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 725-26.
20001
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blatantly admitted that it failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, the State boldly asked for a second chance." The California Court
of Appeals denied this request, reasoning that a retrial of the sentencing phase
would violate the federal Double Jeopardy Clause where the State failed to produce
sufficient evidence on its first try.' The State appealed the decision and received
a reversal by the California Supreme Court." In a 4-3 decision, the California
Supreme Court held that retrying non-capital sentencing does not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause.' The United States Supreme Court granted Monge's
petition for certiorari.'
B. United States Supreme Court's Holding
The United States Supreme Court refused to extend its holding in Bullington to
provide double jeopardy protection to all sentencing proceedings. In a 5-4
decision, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
applies only to capital sentencing." Effectively, the Court allowed the prosecution
another chance to prove its recidivism case, thereby placing Monge's liberty in
jeopardy indefinitely. Moreover, the Court stated that "trial-like protections" in a
sentencing phase are "a matter of legislative grace, not Constitutional command."'
Finally, the Court reiterated a long-standing rule that a State may provide more
protection for its criminal defendants than the United States Constitution, but is not
required to do so.'"
C. Majority Opinion by Justice O'Connor
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor focused on the distinction between
capital and non-capital sentencing. Citing precedent,'' the Court stated that
double jeopardy protection historically has never applied to sentencing."
Because Bullington created an exception for capital sentencing, Justice O'Connor's
opinion focused on justifying an exception only when death is at stake.'" Also,
the opinion centered on the idea that sentencing is not a separate offense and is not
an additional punishment, and therefore, is not entitled to double jeopardy protec-
tion."° Specifically, the Court stated that sentence enhancement for recidivism
is not "new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes" but is "a stiffened
93. See id. at 725.
94. See id. at 726.
95. See id.
96. See Monge, 941 P.2d at 1134.
97. See Monge v. California, 522 U.S. 1072 (1998).
98. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 734.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,747 (1994); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,
438 (1981).
102. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 728.
103. See id. at 730-34.




penalty for the latest crime. '""u The majority rejected the dissent's argument that
sentencing is an element of the offense that deserves double jeopardy protec-
tion."n Citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States,"n Justice O'Connor "rejected
an absolute rule that an enhancement constitutes an element of the offense any
time that it increases the maximum sentence to which a defendant is exposed.""'
The Court also reasoned that non-capital sentencing does not require
constitutional finality." After the sentencing phase is complete, nothing prevents
a court from adjusting a defendant's non-capital sentence, thereby possibly
depriving any person of his liberty whenever the prosecution digs up more
evidence. "' However, unlike mere liberty, a defendant's life does receive
protection from double jeopardy. In an effort to distinguish life from liberty, the
Court rationalized the Bullington exception to this rule using four arguments. First,
the sentencing "jury's deliberations bore the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or in-
nocence""' because it had to decide between imprisonment and death. Second,
like a trial, the prosecution must prove aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt."' The Bullington Court distinguished non-capital sentencing
by stating that, in capital sentencing, when the jury decides to sentence a defendant
to life in prison, it necessarily follows that the prosecution failed to prove those
aggravating circumstances required for a death sentence."' Third, the prosecution
formally presents evidence much like it would at a trial."4 Finally, the Court
recognized that the need for finality of a capital sentencing phase goes with the
finality of imposing a death sentence."' It reasoned that limiting a defendant's
embarrassment, expense, ordeal, anxiety, and insecurity is more crucial in capital
sentencing proceedings." 6
In conclusion, the Court affirmed the California Supreme Court decision to bar
double jeopardy protection in non-capital sentencing."' Justice O'Connor sum-
marized the majority's reasoning by stating that "[mlany States have chosen to
implement procedural safeguards to protect defendants who may face dramatic
increases in their sentences as a result of recidivism enhancements.... [W]ere we
to apply double jeopardy here, we might create disincentives that would diminish
these important procedural protections.""'
105. Id. (citing Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)).
106. See id. at 729.
107. 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998).
108. Monge, 524 U.S. at 729.
109. See id





115. See id. at 732.
116. See id.
117. See id at 734.
118. Id.
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D. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Following the reasoning of Burks, Justice Stevens argued that the prosecution
should not get a second chance to prove its allegations." 9 Instead of drawing a
line between capital and non-capital sentencing, Justice Stevens based his dissent
on the distinction between a retrial after legal error and a retrial after insufficient
evidence."2 He argued that a court may retry after legal error because a defen-
dant deserves one trial free of error.' However, Justice Stevens contended that
under Burks the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a retrial when the state fails to
produce sufficient evidence." Justice Stevens believed that by drawing this line,
courts would avoid the conceptual confusion encountered when applying the
Double Jeopardy Clause."n
E. Dissent by Justices Scalia, Souter and Ginsburg
Justices Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg agreed that the Double Jeopardy Clause
should not apply to ordinary, non-capital sentencing.u However, Justice Scalia,
writing for the dissenters, believed that the majority missed the real issue in the
case."2 Using the "same elements" test from Blockburger v. United States,"
Justice Scalia concluded that enhanced sentencing is an element of the offense.'"
Following this reasoning, sentence enhancement deserves constitutional protec-
tion. " Additionally, Justice Scalia stated that California law conveniently
discards constitutional rights by treating sentence enhancements as separate
crimes.'" Justice Scalia predicted that this method would lead courts down a
slippery slope resulting in a state discarding all constitutional rights when such
rights become inconvenient.'"
IV. The Analysis and Implications of Monge
A. Analysis of the United States Supreme Court's Decision
1. The Bullington Analysis
While the United States Supreme Court obviously is not bound to the Bullington
precedent, the Monge Court flagrantly disregarded the true rationale behind the
decision to provide double jeopardy protection in sentencing. The purpose behind
119. See id. at 734 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




124. See id at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. See id.
126. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
127. Monge, 524 U.S. at 738 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. See id)
129. See id. at 739.




Bullington and the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent the government from
placing someone's life or liberty at stake more than once for an offense.' The
Clause protects a defendant by giving the prosecution one chance to prove its case
in a trial proceeding. The Bullington Court clearly set forth the trial-like
proceedings that trigger double jeopardy protection. However, in an effort to
limit Bullington, the Court erroneously focused on the capital versus non-capital
distinction when deciding Monge. Thus, the Monge Court manipulated Bullington
to fit its goal. Relying on a capital/non-capital distinction is erroneous because it
demeans the value of a person's liberty. For example, when the government placed
Monge's liberty in jeopardy at the first sentencing trial, the trial court should have
sentenced Monge to only five years in prison because the prosecution failed to
prove its enhancement case. By allowing the prosecution another chance, the State
placed Monge's liberty in jeopardy again. Thus, the State had the opportunity to
subject Monge to more than double his original sentence, provided the prosecution
could produce sufficient evidence in the second sentencing phase.
In Bullington, the Court recognized that placing a defendant in this "continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity"'3 is unconstitutional. Therefore, the primary
focus of Bullington was not on the capital versus non-capital distinction, but on the
trial-like procedure of the sentencing phase. The Court specifically stated that the
Double Jeopardy Clause should protect a defendant when the sentencing phase
bears "the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence."'' The Court found three
hallmarks most important. First, the Missouri law required a separate pre-sentence
hearing empaneling a jury to determine the sentence."5 Second, at this hearing,
the prosecution had to prove elements of an aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt - a higher standard than the usual preponderance of the
evidence." Third, the Missouri law did not allow the jury unfettered discretion
regarding the sentence it could impose." 7 Because the jury could choose between
the death penalty or life in prison,"' the Court found that the jury had standards
to guide its exercise of discretion. "9 For these reasons, the Bullington Court
found that the pre-sentence hearing was in essence a trial on the issue of
punishment." Specifically, the Court noted the procedural similarities between
a trial and the pre-sentence hearing as including opening statements, testimony and
evidence, jury instructions, closing arguments, and jury deliberating and returning
a verdict. 4'
131. See supra notes 33, 50 and accompanying text.
132. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,438-41 (1981).
133. Id. at 445 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
134. Id. at 439.
135. See id. at 438.
136. See id
137. See id.
138. See id at 440.
139. See id. at 438.
140. See id
141. See id at 438 n.10.
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If the Monge Court had focused on the procedural similarities as did the
Bullington Court, it would arguably have reached a different conclusion. The
distinct, trial-like procedure of a bifurcated sentencing phase involving enhan-
cement should trigger constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Under
California law, 4' Monge's sentence enhancement hearing included many of the
hallmarks of a trial on guilt or innocence. First, California law allowed for a
separate trial with a judge or jury to determine whether to impose an enhanced
sentence. 43 Second, at this hearing, the prosecution had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt'" that the defendant was previously convicted of a serious
felony. 45 Third, California law did not give the judge or jury unfettered
discretion regarding the sentence it could impose." The trier of fact had
sentencing guidelines to follow. If the state proved the recidivist allegations, then
the primary sentence would double.4 In essence, a decision to enhance the
sentence meant that the prosecution had proven its case. A decision not to enhance
the sentence meant that the prosecution had failed to provide sufficient evidence
to prove recidivism. For these reasons, the Monge Court should have found that
the sentence enhancement phase was, in essence, a trial on the issue of punish-
ment. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause should have prevented the
prosecution from getting a second chance to prove its case, whether the nature of
the sentencing trial was capital or non-capital. The line the courts must draw is
between trial-like and non-trial-like sentencing procedures. Instead, the Monge
Court improperly drew the line between life and death.
2. The Burks/Lockhart Analysis
The Court in both Burks v. United States'48 and Lockhart v. Nelson4" made
the necessary distinction between a retrial based on insufficient evidence and a
retrial based on legal error. In fact, Burks stated that such a distinction is critical
in alleviating some "conceptual confusion" encountered when analyzing double
jeopardy issues."s Based on this distinction, the United States Supreme Court in
Burks held that when the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, "the only
'just' remedy available for [the reviewing] court is the direction of a judgment of
acquittal."'.' Applying this distinction to Lockhart, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of retrial of a sentence enhancement hearing where legal
error occurred. In Lockhart, the defendant pleaded guilty to burglary charges. In
a separate sentencing hearing, the State alleged recidivism and had the burden of
142. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b)-(1), 1170.12(a)-(d), 1192.7(c)(8), 1192.7(c)(23) (Vest 1991).
143. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 969.5 (West 1991).
144. See People v. Tenner, 862 P.2d 840, 845 (Cal. 1993).
145. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West 1991).
146. See id. §§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12(a)-(d).
147. See id.
148. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
149. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
150. See Burks, 437 U.S. at 15.




proving the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt." As required by Arkansas
enhancement statutes, the State presented evidence of four prior convictions at the
hearing." The defendant contended at trial that the governor had pardoned one
of those convictions. Believing the defendant was mistaken, the court ultimately
disregarded his contention." Seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the defendant
again maintained that the governor had pardoned the conviction. After inves-
tigation, the district court found that the governor had pardoned the conviction and
declared the enhanced sentence invalid. When the State requested a second chance
to provide evidence of another conviction in place of the pardoned conviction, the
court denied the request based on the Double Jeopardy Clause.55 Affirming, the
Eighth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did prevent a retrial. It found
that a pardoned conviction was inadmissible to prove enhancement allegations.
Finally, the Eighth Circuit Court reasoned that without that conviction the State
failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the enhancement allegations."6
In Lockhart, the United States Supreme Court held that, whether erroneously
admitted or not, the totality of evidence would have been sufficient to sustain the
sentencing enhancement." Again, the United States Supreme Court relied upon
the distinction between legal error and insufficient evidence to determine whether
the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded retrial.' The Lockhart Court relied on the
following language from Burks:
[R]eversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficien-
cy, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has
failed to prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that
the defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is
defective in some fundamental respect . . . . When this occurs, the
accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his
guilt free from error .... "
The Court concluded that the basis for retrial of the sentencing allegations was
legal error, not insufficient evidence." It reasoned that if the defendant had
offered proof of the pardon at trial, then the judge would have allowed the
prosecution a chance to offer another conviction to prove the charges. 6' Because
152. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 34-35.
153. See id. at 35.
154. See id at 36.
155. See id at 37.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 34.
158. See id. at 40.
159. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
160. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40.
161. See id. at 42.
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the admission was a legal error, the Court found that the Double Jeopardy Clause
did not preclude a retrial."
Lockhart is significant because the Court used the Burks distinction to decide
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a retrial of a sentencing hearing.
Thus, in dicta, the Court showed that it was willing to provide double jeopardy
protection if the basis for retrial solely had been insufficient evidence rather than
erroneous admission of a null conviction.' Furthermore, the Court stated that
the prosecution would have had an opportunity at the sentencing hearing to
provide additional evidence. Therefore, the Court's decision "merely recreate[d] the
situation that would have been obtained if the trial court had excluded"'" the
pardoned conviction.
Using the Burks and Lockhart rationale, the Monge Court should have held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a retrial of the sentencing allegations because
the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence at trial. Applying Lockhart,
the Court should have gone through three steps to reach this conclusion. First, the
United States Supreme Court should have applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to
Monge's sentencing phase. The Court had no problem doing so in either Lockhart
or Bullington. Monge's liberty was at stake. Allowing the prosecution as many
chances as it needs to deprive Monge's liberty, even in a sentencing trial,
undermines the very purpose behind the Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, the
Court should have distinguished between a retrial based on legal error and a retrial
based on insufficient evidence, applying double jeopardy protection for the latter.
As stated in Burks, this distinction avoids any conceptual confusion encountered
when analyzing double jeopardy issues. Because the sentencing trial contained no
legal errors, the Court lacked a reason to allow readjudication of Monge's
sentencing enhancement. Moreover, the prosecution conceded that its evidence
failed to support the recidivism allegation.'" Finally, with the prosecution's
conceding insufficient evidence, the Court should have treated the prosecution's
failure to prove its case as an acquittal regarding the recidivism allegations.'"
The trial court allowed the prosecution to present all its evidence regarding the
"serious felony" allegations. If the trial court had properly found that the evidence
did not prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, then it would not have
162. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 42.
163. Interestingly, in a footnote, the Lockhart Court expressed no aversion to extending double
jeopardy protection to non-capital sentencing. See id. at 37 n.6. The Court stated that usually it would
answer whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive non-clapital sentencing proceedings. See
id. The courts below found that the Double Jeopardy Clause did bar a successive sentencing. See id.
Therefore, the Court "assume[d], without deciding, that [the issue] present[ed] no barrier to reaching the
double jeopardy claim raised." Id. So, the lower courts provided double jeopardy protection to non-
capital sentencing, assuming that to be constitutionally sound. Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court assumed, albeit without deciding, that the lower courts acted constitutionally. See id. Hence,
allowing double jeopardy protection for mere liberty apparently was not as repugnant to the Court in
1988.
164. Id at 42.
165. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 725 (1998).




enhanced Monge's sentence and would not have deprived his liberty. Therefore,
as in Lockhart, the Court should have "recreated" the just conclusion that the trial
court should have obtained.167 Applying this type of analysis, the Double
Jeopardy Clause should have barred the enhancement of Monge's sentence.
In summary, although the United States Supreme Court has expressed no
aversion to applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to non-capital sentencing in the
past,' in Monge the Court denied Double Jeopardy protection in non-capital
sentencing. However, the Monge Court expressed no justifiable reason for making
the capital versus non-capital distinction, other than a strained application of the
Bullington reasoning. Had the Court accurately applied Bullington, it would have
barred Monge's sentencing retrial for two reasons. First, the enhancement
proceedings bore the hallmarks of a trial. Second, because of the trial-like aspects,
the sentencing phase required finality. No person, not even Monge, deserves to
live in constant fear of the State lengthening a sentence whenever it finally gathers
enough evidence. Preventing this type of suspense is at the heart of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Essentially, the only situation in which the Court should have
allowed a retrial is if a legal error had occurred requiring readjudication.
B. The Effect of Monge on Oklahoma
1. Where Oklahoma Stands
At this time, Oklahoma provides more protection for its defendants than the
United States Constitution demands. No Oklahoma case has specifically addressed
the issue of whether double jeopardy protection applies to non-capital sentencing.
However, precedent indicates the courts will bar a retrial of sentencing allegations
when no legal errors occur."s Applying the "clean slate" rule, Oklahoma courts
do not apply double jeopardy protection when a defendant's sentence is void for
legal error." Furthermore, Oklahoma courts have stated that a void sentence is
the only justification for retrying sentencing issues."" This rationale follows the
167. The Lockhart Court stated: "Our holding today thus merely recreates the situation that would
have been obtained if the trial court had excluded the evidence of the conviction .... "I,.at 43. Hence,
the Court merely wanted to rule in a way that created an outcome that would have existed if the trial
court done its job correctly.
168. See, e.g., id.
169. See Cooper v. State, 810 P.2d 1303 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (barring the retrial of recidivism
allegations where the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence at non-capital sentencing). It is
important to note that a careful reading of Burks and Bullington, before Monge, would have indicated
that the Court was willing to extend double jeopardy protection to trial-like proceedings where no legal
errors had occurred. Therefore, the Oklahoma courts may choose to limit double jeopardy protection to
only capital sentencing in the future as well.
170. See Salazar v. State, 919 P.2d 1120, 1127 n.8 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (applying the clean slate
rule to a capital sentencing case where legal error had occurred).
171. See Robertson v. State, 888 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (applying the clean slate
* rule to a non-capital sentencing case where original sentence was void). The Robertson court gives
several examples of sentences "void on their face" including sentences outside the statutory limit,
sentences modified by a trial court after ajury has imposed it, and sentences modified after the defendant
began serving the sentence. See id. at 1025 n.7 & n.10. Therefore, a void sentence appears to be one
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rule that a defendant is entitled to one trial free from legal error. Moreover, the
Oklahoma approach alleviates the conceptual confusion encountered when dealing
with double jeopardy issues.
Additionally, Oklahoma's sentencing procedures for enhancements also bear the
hallmarks of a trial. First, the courts allow bifurcated sentencing proceedings to
prove enhancement allegations." Second, the prosecution must prove the
recidivism allegations beyond a reasonable doubt." Third, the judge or jury does
not have unfettered discretion when determining a sentence.'74 For these reasons,
an enhancement sentencing proceeding is essentially a trial on the issue of
punishment. Therefore, if the prosecution fails to provide sufficient evidence to
prove recidivism, that failure is the equivalent of an acquittal of those charges.
2. Oklahoma's Options
Since Monge specifically stated that nothing requires courts to provide double
jeopardy protection in non-capital sentencing, Oklahoma now has the option of
lowering its standard. However, to preserve the fundamental ideal so deeply
ingrained in our nation's history, Oklahoma must continue to protect its defendants
from an unjust retrial when the prosecution fails to prove its case. Except where
legal error occurs, the United States Constitution demands that sentencing
procedures have finality to prevent a defendant from living in constant fear of
deprivation of liberty. This is true despite the contrary interpretation of the
Constitution found in the Monge decision.
Since the Court lowered the constitutional standard, Oklahoma courts should
choose to provide more protection than the United States Constitution now
requires. When a sentencing procedure contains the hallmarks of a trial, Oklahoma
courts should afford the defendant the same constitutional protections of a trial,
including protection against double jeopardy. Accordingly, the prosecution should
not get multiple chances to prove its case. Allowing the prosecution a chance to
gather more evidence in anticipation of a defendant's appeal is a clear abuse of our
constitutional principles.
The Monge Court stated that double jeopardy protection in non-capital
sentencing is a matter best left to "legislative grace, not constitutional com-
mand."'75 Indisputably, a person's liberty should not be left to anyone's grace or
charity, especially when the United States Constitution commands the protection
of both life and liberty with equal fervor. 76 In order to maintain these fundamen-
where the trial court committed a legal error by imposing the prescribed sentence.
172. Although not required in every trial, Oklahoma courts do allow bifurcated proceedings where
prior convictions are inadmissible in the guilt phase but necessary to the sentencing phase. See Reed v.
State, 657 P.2d 662, 665 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (discussing when the law requires bifurcated trials).
173. See Mitchell v. State, 659 P.2d 366, 369-70 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
174. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 20.1 (Supp. 1998) (setting out sentencing guidelines for crimes and
enhancement due to recidivism).
175. Monge, 524 U.S. at 734.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person be... deprived of life, liberty or property,




tal principles, Oklahoma must retain double jeopardy protection for its defendants
in cases of noncapital sentencing despite the Monge Court's opinion that the
Constitution requires less.
V. Conclusion
After Monge, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect a defendant from a
retrial of non-capital sentencing allegations.'" As it stands, the prosecution can
provide more evidence to support its allegations if evidentiary insufficiency is an
issue on appeal. Also, the Monge Court rejected the contention that an appellate
court's finding of insufficient evidence was analogous to acquittal of the recidivist
allegations." 8 Abandoning previous benchmarks, the Court drew a sharp dis-
tinction between capital and non-capital sentencing," focusing on the severity
of punishment at stake instead of the trial-like nature of the proceeding. Finally,
the Court reasoned that an extension of double jeopardy protection to non-capital
sentencing would diminish incentives for the individual states to keep important
procedural safeguards."w
Considering this decision, Oklahoma courts now must decide whether to retain
procedural safeguards providing double jeopardy protection in non-capital
sentencing. Currently, Oklahoma courts distinguish between a retrial for legal error
and a retrial for insufficient evidence, with the latter protected from double
jeopardy. Recognizing every person's inalienable, constitutional right to liberty,
Oklahoma should retain this important safeguard and continue to protect life and
liberty with equal fervor. Oklahoma should provide strenuous and unwavering
constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause instead of the callous
indifference shown by the United States Supreme Court in Monge.
Eva Maria Floyd
to the states).
177. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 734 (1998).
178. See id at 732.
179. See id. at 731.
180. See id. at 733-34.
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